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Title Federalism and South Africa's Democratic Bargain: The Zuma Challenge
Full text http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/6239g0gb
Date 2009
Author(s) Inman, Robert P.; Rubinfeld, Daniel
Abstract South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy stands as one of the past century's most important political events. The major hurdle to the transition was for the poor majority ANC to provide a credible promise not to exploit the full economic resources of the then ruling economic elite. The new constitution adopted a form of federal governance that has the potential to provide such protections by specifying an annual policy game where the new majority and the minority elite each control one policy instrument of importance to the other. Provided the majority is sufficiently patient and not "too demanding" in their preferences for redistribution the game has a stable equilibrium with less than maximal redistributive taxation. Our analysis makes these restrictions on preferences precise. The new, more radical ANC and the Zuma presidency challenge this equilibrium.
Language english
Publisher eScholarship, University of California
Type of publication article
Format application/pdf
Source Inman, Robert P.; & Rubinfeld, Daniel. (2009). Federalism and South Africa's Democratic Bargain: The Zuma Challenge. UC Berkeley: Berkeley Program in Law and Economics. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/6239g0gb
Rights public
Identifier qt6239g0gb
Repository Berkeley - University of California
Added to C-A: 2014-02-03;10:11:41