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Title
Promotions and Productivity: The Role of Meritocracy and Pay Progression in the Public Sector |
Full text
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6b02500b |
Date
2021 |
Author(s)
Deserranno, Erika; Kastrau, Philipp; León-Ciliotta, Gianmarco |
Abstract
We study promotion incentives in the public sector by means of a field experiment with the Ministry of Health in Sierra Leone. The experiment creates exogenous variation in meritocracy by linking promotions to performance for the lowest tier of health workers and in perceived pay progression by revealing to them the salary of higher-tier workers. We find that meritocratic promotions lead to higher productivity for workers who expect a steep pay increase and those who are highly ranked in terms of performance. When promotions are not meritocratic, increasing the pay gradient instead reduces worker productivity through negative morale effects. The findings highlight the importance of taking into account the interactions between different tools of personnel policy.  |
Subject(s)
promotions; meritocracy; pay progression; worker productivity; public sector; firm employment decisions; promotions; Sierra Leone; compensation; compensation methods; wage level; wage structure; wage differentials; bureaucracy |
Publisher
eScholarship, University of California |
Type of publication
article |
Format
application/pdf |
Rights
public |
Identifier
qt6b02500b |
Repository
Berkeley - University of California
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Added to C-A: 2021-10-05;12:35:36 |
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