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Title A social ontology of 'maximal' persons
Full text http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/25537; http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/24862
Date 2021
Author(s) Oyowe, Oritsegbubemi Anthony
Abstract In this paper, I address a range of arguments put forward by Kwame Gyekye (1992) and Bernard Matolino (2014) denying Menkiti's twin propositions that persons differ ontologically from human beings and that human attitudes, behaviours and practices constitute persons in social reality. They argue that his account of 'maximal' persons, rooted in African traditional thought-worlds, conflates issues and ultimately involve him in a category mistake. I argue that their arguments do not succeed, and that Menkiti's view is not in any predicament because of them. Then, I draw on John Searle's account of social ontology to clarify the sense in which attitudes, behaviours and practices are constituents of persons. Thus, I characterise persons as social entities belonging in a social ontology. Finally, I argue that realism regarding persons is not undermined by the threat of conventionalism lurking behind the view. - Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100005156 - National Research Foundation http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100001321 - Peer Reviewed
Subject(s) African; community; conventions; person; realism; social ontology; 150 Psychologie; ddc:150
Language eng
Publisher Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Type of publication article; doc-type:article; publishedVersion
Format application/pdf
Rights (CC BY 4.0) Attribution 4.0 International; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Identifier urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-110-18452/25537-4; 10.1111/jtsb.12312; 1468-5914
Repository Berlin - Humboldt University of Berlin
Added to C-A: 2022-06-29;10:13:28